
































The objective of this paper is to suggest a framework on the basis of which a wealth allocation formula could be 
based in the context of the current (2003) conflict resolution efforts . The idea behind the framework is that of 
minimizing poverty in a two region economy (South and North) by allocating a given total of resources between the 
two regions. With poverty summarized by the head count ratio the resulting allocation formula depends on a number 
of poverty magnitudes such as the head count ratios for the two regions, the growth elasticity of poverty in each 
region and the elasticity of the per capita expenditure of the South to that of the North. Due to lack of information on 
poverty by region an indirect method of estimating the relevant poverty magnitudes is used. A major result of the 
paper is that Nakuru sharing formula of overall net revenue from oil (of 48% to the South) could be supported by the 
proposed framework and the derived formulae. 
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As is well known Sudan suffered from two civil wars during the post independence period. A 
first civil war that has started in 1955, but is usually classified in the literature as having started 
in the 1960s, and was settled in 1972 with peace duration of about ten years. The second war 
started in 1983 and is still going on. The fact that the Sudanese civil wars have persisted for so 
long does not mean that serious attempts at resolving the conflicts were not made. Several peace 
initiatives were made during the second democracy, following the October 1964 popular uprising 
that brought down the military regime (1958-64) of General Abboud. These efforts culminated in 
the Khartoum Round Table Conference in 1965, which was attended by representatives of exiled 
Southern political parties, Northern political leaders as well as leaders of the Professionals and 
Workers Union in addition to observers from neighboring African countries. Propelled by the 
atmosphere of the return to democracy, and some confidence-building measures enacted by the 
transitional government, this conference was viewed with a lot of optimism. Unfortunately, the 
optimism appeared to be unfounded and the conference ended in a dismal failure (for details of 
the Round Table Conference see Beshir (1968: 88-97)). The reasons for the failure of the 
Conference have been the subject of analysis in the literature of the Sudanese civil war   
(e.g. Johnson (2003), and Khalid (2003)).       
 
In 1972 an end to the civil war was achieved as a result of the Addis Ababa peace agreement 
between the main insurgency movement during the first civil war (Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SSLM)) and the second military regime of General Nimeiri that lasted for the   
period 1969-1985. The peace agreement, better known as the Addis Ababa Peace Accord, 
guaranteed the South a regional autonomy within a united Sudan with a Southern Peoples￿ 
Regional Assembly as a legislature and a High Executive Council as a Southern Regional 
government exercising executive powers in addition to an independent civil service commission. 
The Addis Ababa Peace Accord   brought peace to the Sudan for about ten years (1972-83), 
where the South enjoyed full-fledged democratic governance in contrast to the rest   
of the country.  
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According to an overall assessment of the Addis Ababa Peace Accord over the period 1972-1981 
￿South Sudan enjoyed a sub-system of the Nimeri regime. The situation amounted then to an 
island of liberal parliamentary democracy in an ocean of one party dictatorship and the personal 
rule of Nimeri in the whole country. What this system lacked, or was denied, was the economic 
power and resources to sustain and develop the Southern Region. This was marked by the 
deterioration in the condition of living in the South, economic stagnation and social anarchy￿ 
(Nyaba (1997: 21)). The deteriorating ￿conditions of living￿, ￿economic stagnation￿ and ￿social 
anarchy￿ in the South resulted in wide-spread Southern dissatisfaction with the political and 
economic arrangements put in place by the Addis Ababa peace agreement. Combined with 
various trigger mechanisms this dissatisfaction eventually led to the eruption of the second civil 
war in 1983. The implication of this overall assessment is that the post-conflict economy of 
Sudan over the period 1972-1983 was not capable of sustaining the Addis Ababa peace process 
(see also Khalid (2003: 153)). 
 
The second civil war started in 1983. Unlike the first civil war at the outbreak of the second civil 
war a rebel movement, Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) with an army (Sudan People 
Liberation Army, SPLA), was established to lead the struggle (for some of the inside stories 
regarding the formation of the SPLM/A see Nyaba (1997) and Akol (2001), and for 
supplementary information see Khalid (2003 and Johnson (2003)). According to Khalid   
(2003: 155) the ￿agenda of the SPLM/A was not the resurrection of the Addis Ababa Accord, but 
the liberation of the whole country from what it saw as defective political infrastructures. At the 
center of the SPLM￿s new thinking was the salvation of all the marginalized areas of Sudan. 
Those areas, in comparison of the riverain North, had been for decades eking out a life without 
hope and mired in squalor￿. Though not official this summary of the grievance discourse of the 
SPLM explains to a large extent the duration of the second civil war and the multiplicity of 
initiatives to resolve the conflict (for details of these initiatives see, among others, Khalid (2003) 
and Johnson (2003)).  
 
Irrespective of the details of the recent history of peace initiatives for Sudan it is probably well 
known that the most active initiative is that of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertification (IGADD), established in the 1970s and renamed the Inter-Governmental Agency 
for Development (IGAD) in 1997
2. IGAD mediation efforts started in 1993 and came up with a 
                                                 
2 Members of IGAD are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. According to Khalid 
(2003: 369) the IGAD mediation process ￿took place at the initiative of General Bashir himself. In an IGAD Summit 
held in Addis Ababa in September 1993, General Bashir invite IGAD to mediate in the Sudanese conflict￿.     
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declaration of principles (DOP) in May 1994 that affirmed the right of self-determination of the 
people of the South Sudan through a referendum. The DOP also explicitly noted that 
￿appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various peoples of Sudan must be realized￿ 
(for the text of the DOP see Deng (n.d.: 121-122)). In the wake of 11 September 2001 attacks, 
and in the context of the war on terror, the US became actively involved in the IGAD process as 
a facilitator, together with the UK and Norway, albeit with its own peace initiative. The IGAD 
process resulted in the Machakos Protocol signed on July 2002 that ￿was hailed as a   
major step towards peace, resolving issues of self-determination and state and religion￿   
(Johnson (2003: 179)).  
 
In July 2003 a ￿draft framework for resolution of outstanding issues arising out of the 
elaborations of the Machakos Protocol￿ was presented to the parties in the negotiations in 
Nakuru, Kenya. The Nakuru draft framework is composed of three parts: part one is on ￿power 
sharing￿; part two is on ￿wealth sharing￿; and part three is on ￿security arrangements￿. There is 
also a Nakuru ￿draft framework for resolution of the three conflict areas￿. In what follows we 
deal with the draft on the resolution of outstanding issues despite the fact that the one dealing 
with the ￿three conflict areas￿ embodies an allocation formula relevant to them. Moreover, focus 
will be on part two on ￿wealth sharing.   
 
Part two on ￿wealth sharing￿ starts with specifying the ￿guiding principles in respect of an 
equitable sharing of common wealth￿. Among the guiding principles for equitable sharing of the 
common wealth of the country are the following:  
(a) ￿the wealth of the Sudan must be shared equitably so as to permit each level of 
government discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties￿;  
(b) ￿the sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan 
shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity, and living conditions of all citizens 
are promoted without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, 
political affiliation, ethnicity, or region. The sharing and allocation of wealth 
shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development￿;  
(c) ￿Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, should 
be brought up to the same average social/economic standard and public services 
as the Northern states. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to 
build up local capacity ￿ institutional, human and economic￿                       
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While these principles are acceptable they remain vague as to the relevant indicators to be used 
to ensure the ￿equitable sharing￿ of income and wealth between the various regions in a 
development context. Principle (a) emphasizes the importance of respecting the administrative 
constraints of the various levels of government to enable them to ￿discharge legal and 
constitutional responsibilities and duties￿. Such requirements are usually reflected in government 
budgets. Principle (b) can be understood as emphasizing the importance of promoting non-
discriminatory development, where development is broadly defined in terms of the ￿quality of 
life￿ and ￿living conditions￿ of all citizens. Both the ￿quality of life￿ and ￿living conditions￿ are 
left undefined. Principle (c) could be interpreted as embodying an objective function to guide the 
design of a wealth allocation formula in the form of minimizing the gap in average 
￿social/economic standard and public services￿ between the South and the North. Once again the 
￿social/economic standard￿ is left undefined.      
 
A specific formula for sharing oil revenue is proposed in article 6 of part two of the Nakuru 
framework. The formula defines the ￿net revenue from oil￿ in a very precise way, with 
appropriate caveats for possible future events on the price front. In addition an ￿oil revenue 
stabilization account￿ is to be set up such that net oil revenue derived from sales at prices above 
an agreed benchmark prices (established annually in the context of the national budget) are to be 
deposited. After payments into the stabilization account, if any, 2% of the net oil revenue ￿shall 
be transferred to oil producing states in proportion to output produced in each state￿. This 
percentage is applicable to ￿oil producing contracts current on the date of the beginning of the 
interim period￿ as well as to ￿contracts that are not producing oil at the beginning of the interim 
period, whether signed before or after that date￿. The overall net revenue (i.e. after payments into 
the stabilization account and transfers to the producing states) from oil produced in Southern 
Sudan ￿forty-eight (48%) percent of the new balance shall be paid to the Government of 
Southern Sudan. The remaining balance shall be paid to the Government of the Sudan￿.  
 
As it happened the government of Sudan rejected the whole Nakuru framework as a basis for 
negotiations for the seventh round of peace talks that resumed on 11 August 2003 but remained 
stalled up to 17 August 2003. The government￿s position is articulated in a document, dated 
11 July 2003, entitled ￿comments and remarks of GOS delegation on draft framework for 
resolution of outstanding issues arising out of the elaborations of the Machakos protocol and 
other important issues￿. In section 5 of the government￿s document, entitled ￿an overview of the  
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wealth sharing segment￿, it is noted that ￿it was agreed at the last round to convene a technical 
group meeting supported by the World Bank and IMF consultants to agree with the parties to 
working out the allocation based on an agreed upon framework. Instead of doing that, we have 
been presented with a set of figures which is far removed from what had already (been) 
projected, and which in our opinion defeats the principles￿.  
 
The objective of this paper is to suggest a framework on the basis of which a wealth allocation 
formula could be based. The framework is based on the UN Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) on poverty reduction. Eight Millennium Development Goals were articulated in the UN 
Millennium Declaration in September 2000. According to the United Nations (UN (2002: 8)) the 
￿development goals set out in the Millennium Declaration express the resolve of the world￿s 
political leaders to free their fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing 
conditions of extreme poverty, to make the right to development a reality for everyone, and to 
free the entire human race from want￿
3. The first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) is to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Two major targets under this goal have been specified. 
The first target is to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (living on less than 
US$1.08 per person per day) by the year 2015. As is well known, the proportion of people living 
in extreme poverty is the head count ratio while the income level of US$ 1.08 per person per day 
is the poverty line
4.   
 
On the basis of the MDG on poverty section (II) presents the proposed analytical framework. In 
a nutshell the idea behind the framework is that of minimizing poverty in a two region economy 
(South and North) by allocating a given total of resources between the two regions. With poverty 
summarized by the head count ratio the resulting allocation formula depends on a number of 
poverty magnitudes such as the head count ratios for the two regions, the growth elasticity of 
poverty in each region and the elasticity of the per capita expenditure of the South to that of the 
North. In section (III) the results are reported, where due to lack of information on poverty by 
regions an indirect method of estimating the relevant poverty magnitudes is used. A major issue 
to be explored in the results section is the condition under which the Nakuru sharing formula of 
overall net revenue from oil could be supported by the proposed framework and the derived 
formulae. Section (IV) presents a few concluding remarks.            
                                                 
3 See UN (2002: 8). 
4 For the importance of poverty in the context of development see, for example, World Bank (2000 and 1991). For a 
broad concept of development on the basis of which MDGs can be justified see Sen (1999). Further, for alternative 
concepts of the poverty line see Ravallion (1998).   
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II. Analytical Framework: 
A logical starting point for a conceptual framework is to look at an economy composed of two 
regions: South, denoted and variables subscripted by, s; and North, denoted and variables 
subscripted by, n.  Many characterizations can be invoked for such regions, but for the purposes 
of developing this framework a historically consistent characterization can be followed. Under 
this characterization the South could be taken as a low real per capita income region and North 
as  a high real per capita income region. If real per capita income is assumed to reflect labor 
productivity then the framework could be taken as invoking a dual economy construct
5. 
  
In the context of such an economy poverty, as measured by the head-count ratio at the national 
level, is the weighted sum of the regional head-count ratios where the weights are the regional 
population shares. In technical terms poverty, as measured by the head-count ratio, H, is given 
by:  
(1) H= α  Hs(µ  s/zs, θ s) + (1- α )  Hn(µ n/ zn, θ n)  
 
where  α  is the share of South population in total population; µ  is per capita consumption 
expenditure; z is per capita poverty line; θ  is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of 
consumption expenditure; the subscripts s and n refer to South and North respectively and noting 
that the national head-count ratio, H,  is given by H = H(µ /z, θ )).     
      
In the context of such an economy, where per capita consumption expenditure differs between 
the regions, it would be natural to assume that the poverty line depends on income in such a way 
that the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to mean consumption expenditure, call it ε , is 
non-negative but less than, or equal to, unity (i.e. 0 ≤  ε  ≤  1)
6. With this assumption, the change in 
poverty over time at the national level can be shown to have two components: a growth 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
5 As is well known there is a vast literature on the dual economy models motivated by the pioneering work of Lewis 
(1954). An analytical summary of this literature is to be found in Dixit (1973).  For a succinct summary of the 
growth patterns in dual economy models see Dixit (1970). For the use of dual economy models to study issues of 
changes in the distribution of income over time see Bourguignon (1990). 
 
6 Note that the case where the elasticity of the poverty line is equal to zero corresponds to the frequent assumption 
used in empirical work where the poverty line is held constant over time and between regions or sectors. The other 
extreme where the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to mean consumption expenditure is equal to unity 
corresponds to the European practice of choosing the poverty line as a fixed proportion of the standard of living 
(usually taken as median income).  
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component, where poverty would be expected to decline as a result of an increase in mean 
consumption given the state of inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure; and a 
distribution component, where poverty would be expected to decline as a result of a decline in 
the degree of inequality in the distribution of consumption, given mean consumption 
expenditure. In technical terms differentiating the national head-count ratio, H(µ /z,  θ ), 
logarithmically with respect to time gives:   
(2) G(H) = (1 - ε ) η  G(µ ) + ν  G(θ )  
 
where G(x)≡  (dx/dt)(1/x) is the respective growth rate of the variable and η  and ν  are the 
elasticities of the head-count ratio with respect to mean consumption expenditure and the Gini 
coefficient respectively}.          
 
It goes without saying that the change in regional poverty over time will have the same structure 
as the change in overall poverty with regional growth and distribution components, appropriately 
defined on the regional mean consumption expenditures, poverty lines and Gini coefficients. In 
technical terms differentiating the regional head-count ratios logarithmically with respect to time 
gives:  
(3) G(Hs)= (1 - ε s) η s G(µ s) + ν s,G(θ s)  
    
(4) G(Hn) =(1 - ε n) η n  G(µ n) + ν n G( θ n)}  
 
In the context of such an economy the regional growth components are related through a 
migration condition in such a way that in equilibrium there exists a gap in favor of the North 
region. Alternatively, the regional growth components could be related through a structural 
relationship with respect to the growth of the economy.  In what follows major issues relating to 
the growth and distribution components at the national level will be discussed.    
 
In view of the discussion in the previous two sections, a behavioral assumption that the state of 
income distribution, as summarized by the Gini coefficient, is a function of the mean 
consumption expenditure can now be made. Recalling the behavioral assumption on the poverty 
line as a function of mean consumption expenditure, the poverty measure will now be a function  
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of mean consumption expenditure with a net growth elasticity of poverty that takes into account 
changes in the distribution of expenditure. In technical terms the head-count ratio at the national 
level can now be looked at as being a function of per capita consumption expenditure, 
 H = H (µ /z(µ ), θ (µ ))=  H(µ ), where µ , z, and  θ  are respectively mean consumption expenditure, 
the poverty line and the Gini coefficient. With the assumptions on z and θ , the percentage change 
in the head-count ratio over time, G(H), is given by:  
(5) G(H)= [η (1 - ε ) +  ν κ ] G(µ )= γ  G(µ )   
 
where η  is the elasticity of the head-count ratio with respect to mean consumption expenditure 
(which is negative), ε  is the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to mean consumption 
expenditure (which is non-negative and equal to , or less than, unity), ν  is the elasticity of the 
head-count ratio with respect to the Gini coefficient (which is positive), and κ  is the elasticity of 
the Gini coefficient with respect to mean consumption expenditure (which could be of any sign 
depending on the stage of development of the economy: at an early stage we would expect it to 
be positive while at a later stage we would expect it to be negative). The expression   
[η (1 - ε ) +  ν κ ], which is denoted by γ , is the growth elasticity of poverty.  
 
Despite the growing empirical literature that attempts to understand the determinants of growth 
across countries, it is generally agreed that growth at the national level is largely driven by the 
investment rate in the economy (investment as a ratio of GDP) and technological progress. 
Assuming, therefore, that mean consumption expenditure is a function of investment, it would 
seem relevant that a government interested in poverty reduction would care about the allocation 
of investment between the two regions to achieve the poverty reduction objective. For short 
periods of time, like the six-year transitional period, the government can be assumed to have a 
given total of resources devoted to investment that can be allocated to the two regions (without 
confusion with standard notation we may denote the total amount of investment resources 
available to the government as K). In the context of Nakuru￿s framework K could be taken as 
￿overall net revenue from oil￿.  
 
The relevant policy question is how should these resources be allocated between the regions in 
order to reduce poverty. This is a standard optimization problem with an objective function and a 
constraint. In this case the objective function is given by the head-count ratio that needs to be 
minimized and the constraint is given by the requirement that the investment resources allocated  
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to the regions should not exceed the total resources available to the government. Given the 
property of the head-count ratio as an additively separable poverty measure, the head-count at 
the national level, H, is a weighted sum of the regional head-count ratios with weights given by 
the population shares; that is:  
(6) H = α  Hs(µ s) + (1 - α  ) Hn(µ n)  
 
where α  is the share of the population of the South in total population.  
 
In such standard problems the requirement for an optimal solution is usually expressed in terms 
of equating the ratio of investment in the South to that in the North to some magnitude given by 
the parameters of the problem
7. In technical terms the problem is of the form where we 
formulated the constraint in per capita terms:  
(7) minimize by choice of ks and kn, H = α  Hs(µ s) + (1 - α  ) Hn(µ n) 
   
(8) subject to the constraint that αks + (1 - α) kn = k and  µ i =µ i(ki)).  
 
To solve this problem use can be made of the constraint to appropriately choose investment in 
the South to minimize the head-count ratio. Doing this it is an easy matter to show that the first 
order condition for an internal solution of minimizing H by choice of kr is given by:  
(9) dH/d ks  = 0 = [α Hs(µ s)γ s E(µ s)/ ks ] - [α  Hn(µ n)γ nE(µ n)/ kn] 
  
where use has been made of the fact that dkn/d ks = - [α/(1 ￿ α)] and where E(µ i ) = (dµ i /dki ) 
(ki / µ i ) is the percentage change in regional mean consumption expenditure as a result of 
percentage change in the resources allocated to the sector. In a sense this elasticity can be 
understood as a regional growth rate. Thus the optimal allocation formula requires that:  
(10)  ks /kn = [Hs(µ s)γ s E(µ s)]/ [  Hn(µ n)γ nE(µ n)] 
 
                                                 
7 For a similar problem in the context of aid effectiveness see Collier and Dollar (2000). Note however that Collier 
and Dollar formulate the objective as the sum of rates of poverty reduction in developing countries and do not 
exploit the additive property of the head-count ratio.     
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That is, the optimal allocation formula would depend on the relative shares of the regions in total 
poverty, the relative sensitivity of regional poverty with respect to growth as captured by the 
regional growth elasticity of poverty and on the relative regional growth rates. Indeed, using the 
constraint, an overall regional allocation formula would require allocating the total available 
resources such that each region would get a share depending on an overall regional response of 
poverty to growth relative to an overall response of poverty to growth at the national level. In 
technical terms substituting for kn from the above allocation ratio in the constraint will give rise 
to the optimal investment in the South and North respectively as:  
(11)  k*s  =  {[Hs(µ s)γ s E(µ s)]/ [Hs(µ s)γ s E(µ s) +   Hn(µ n)γ nE(µ n)]}k ,  
 
(12)  k*n=  {[  Hn(µ n)γ nE(µ n)]/[ Hs(µ s)γ s E(µ s) +   Hn(µ n)γ nE(µ n)]}k.         
 
It is perhaps clear that the above formula can be generalized for a country with more than two 
regions. These poverty reduction regional investment shares could form the basis for the design 
of a resource sharing formula for Sudan. Before applying the formulae it may be useful to note 
that the ratio [E(µ s)]/E(µ n)] gives the elasticity of the income of the South with respect to that of 
the North which may be denoted as E(µ sn). Appropriate normalization of (11) and (12) would 
give the formulae in terms of this new elasticity as:  
     (13)           k*s  = {[γ s  Hs(µ s) E(µ sn) ]/ [γ s  Hs(µ s) E(µ sn) + γ n Hn(µ n)]}k  
 
     (14)           k*n= {[γ n Hn(µ n)]/ [γ s  Hs(µ s) E(µ sn) + γ n Hn(µ n)]}k. 
 
Without trying to claim too much for the above sharing formula it is suggested that it has a 
number of attractive features important among which is that it is based on a transparent objective 
of reducing poverty in the country. Such an objective is dear to the two parties in the conflict and 
is consistent with the UN MDGs. A second attractive feature is that it takes account of the spread 
of poverty as measured by the head count ratio thus taking into account not only the population 
weight of each region but also the weight of those who live below the relevant poverty line. A 
third feature is that it accounts for the structural nature of the responses of poverty to economic 
development in each region as captured by the growth elasticity of poverty. A fourth feature is 
that it accounts for the differential growth performance of the two regions as captured by the 
elasticity of the per capita income of the South with respect to that of the North.  On the basis of  
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these observations it is suggested that such an allocation formula could provide a justification for 
sharing of wealth in the country that respects the grievance discourse of the main liberation 
movement.    
 
III. Data and Results: 
At the outset it needs to be noted that relevant poverty information to apply the formulae in 
equations (13) and (14) is not available for Sudan. As such, therefore, resort will be made to 
indirect methods of estimation and calculation of the variables in question. Such methods are 
frequently invoked in the study of poverty for the developing countries precisely because of lack 
of data (see, for example, Karshenas (2001)).  
 
We start by looking for an estimate for regional per capita income and expenditure. In this 
respect we note that at independence, Sudan￿s GDP was estimated as amounting to   
Ls.284 million (US$795 million). Per capita GDP amounted to Ls.28 or about US$78 classifying 
Sudan among the poorest countries in the world. The distribution of GDP over regions is given 
in table (1).  
 
Table (1): 
GDP and Population of Sudan by Region in 1956 
 








North-East Northern,  Kassala, 
Khartoum 
75786 26.67  2319021  22.60 32.68 
Blue Nile  Blue Nile  86032  30.27  2069646  20.17  41.59 
North-West Kordofan,  Darfur  83777  29.48  3090733  30.11  27.11 
South  Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, 
Upper Nile 
38610 13.59  2783136  27.12 13.87 
Total    284205  100.00 10262536 100.00  27.69 




The table shows that the Blue Nile region, the heart of agricultural development during the 
colonial period, was relatively better than other regions of the country with a per capita GDP that 
amounted to about LS.42 (US$118), followed by the North-East region, which includes the 
capital city of Khartoum, with a per capita GDP of about Ls.33 (US$92) and the North-West 
region with a per capita GDP of Ls.27 (US$76). Overall the GDP per capita for the North 
amounted to Ls. 32.83 ($91.53). The South fared much worse than the northern regions with a 
per capita GDP of about Ls.14 (US$39) reflecting years of neglect and marginalization during 
the colonial period. The poorest northern sub-region has almost twice the per capita of the South. 
The ratio of per capita GDP of the South to that of the North is equal to about 0.43. It is this ratio 
that will be used in what follows.   
 
Real GDP per capita in Sudan in 2000 is reported as US$ 976 in 1985 purchasing power parity 
(PPP)
8. According to official information the share of the population of the South in 2000 was 
about 15.6% (Bahr Al-Ghazal 7.3%; Upper Nile 4.3%; and Equatoria 4%)
9. Using the ratio of 
per capita GDP for the South to that for the North together with the population share of the 
South, per capita GDP for the South in 2000 could be taken as US$ 461 in PPP. This is 
equivalent to a per capita GDP per month of about US$ 38.4 in PPP, slightly higher than the 
international poverty line of US$32 per person per month. GDP per capita for the North is   
US$ 1071 in PPP. Alternatively, using the 1955 population share of the South (of 0.2712) per 
capita GDP for the South would be US$497 in PPP while that of the North would be US$1155 in 
PPP. Note, however, that the relevant standard of living for poverty analysis is per capita 
consumption expenditure. According to national income estimates private consumption 
expenditure averaged about 0.85 of GDP during the 1990s. This implies that per capita 
consumption expenditure in Sudan in 2000 amounted to US$ 830 in PPP. Applying the same 
procedure used to obtain GDP per capita for the South it is an easy matter to establish that per 
capita consumption expenditure in the South amounted to about US$394 in PPP using population 
share of 2000 and US$422 using 1955 population share. These are equivalent respectively to 
US$1.07 and US$1.17 per person per day. Thus per capita consumption expenditure in the South 
using 2000 population share is almost equal to the international poverty line. The per capita 
consumption expenditure for the North is US$911 using the population share of 2000 and 
US$982 using the population share for 1955. These, it is suggested, are reasonable estimates that 
                                                 
8 As is well known working with purchasing power parity figures allows comparison between regions and time 
periods. 
 
9 According to CBS and UNFPA (1999) the share of the population in the South of the country for census years was 
as follows: 19.9% in 1973, 25.6% in 1983 and 16.8% in 1993. Thus taking the two illustrative population shares in  
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can be used in the context of the proposed formulae. Table (2) summarizes these results in a 
transparent manner where per capita GDP and consumption expenditure are in   
US$ in 1985 purchasing power parity. Without causing any confusion in what follows we 
subscript estimates using the population share for the year 2000 by one (e.g. u1 for per capita 
GDP and ￿1 for capita consumption expenditure) and estimates using population share for 1955 
by 2 (e.g. u2 and ￿2).     
 
Table (2): 
Estimates of Regional Per Capita GDP and Consumption Expenditure for 2000 
 
Region Population 







Share in 1955 
Per Capita 




South  0.156 461 394  0.2711 497  422 
North  0.844 1071  911  0.7289 1154  982 
Sudan  1.000 976 830  1.0000 976  830 
        Source: own calculations. 
 
In addition to the above GDP and consumption expenditure estimates the application of the 
proposed formulae requires knowledge of regional poverty shares, the growth elasticity of 
poverty for each region and the elasticity of South￿s income with respect to that of the North. In 
general such knowledge can be obtained in a direct fashion if the required information on the 
distribution of wealth, income or consumption expenditure is available
10. In the case of Sudan 
such data is not available especially for the South
11. As a result resort can be made to indirect 
methods. One such method is to use estimates of poverty measures from cross-country studies 
for regions where countries are judged to be comparable to Sudan in terms of the stage of 
development. The Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region suggests itself as an obvious region.    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the text would amount to representing maximum and minimum shares.   
10 For grouped data the POVCAL program, developed in the World Bank and can be freely downloaded from its 
web site, automatically calculates these elasticities for the FGT measures of poverty. 
  
11 As is well known high quality data for Sudan is available only for 1968 in international data sets such as that of 
Deininger and Squire (1996).  
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For a sample of 18 Sub-Saharan countries poverty measures were calculated based on a poverty 
line that changes with per capita consumption expenditure. A poverty equation is then estimated 
where the natural logarithm of the head count ratio is the dependent variables and per capita 
consumption expenditure and the Gini coefficient (percentage points) are the explanatory 
variables. Such a formulation is preferred to the double logarithm format because it allows the 
elasticity of the head count ratio with respect to each of its determinants to vary with the 
determinant. The resulting estimated equation for the headcount ratio, with White 
heteroscedasticity adjusted absolute t-values in brackets, is given below: 
      (15)  Ln H = 4.1732 ￿ 0.00163 µ   + 0.0124 θ  ; adjusted R-squared = 0.94;   
                           (34.36)     (15.96)           (5.40)  
 
where H is the head-count ratio, µ  is real per capita consumption expenditure in 1985 purchasing 
power parity dollars, and θ  is the Gini coefficient in percentage points. The relevant partial 
elasticities of the head-count ratio are readily obtainable from the above equation as   
ηH = [-0.00163µ ] and ν H = [0.0124θ ] and can be calculated once information for µ  and θ  is 
available.  Note that in view of the fact that the equation is estimated on the basis of a poverty 
line that changes with the level of consumption expenditure the partial elasticity ηH is inclusive 
of the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to consumption expenditure.     
 
In the above estimated equation knowledge of the Gini coefficient, θ, is important for the 
estimation of the head-count ratio. Such information can also be obtained by an indirect method. 
The method depends on an estimation of a Kuznets￿ equation  reported in Ali (1998)
12. The 
estimation is based on a sample of 50 countries: 33 developing countries (12 Latin American,  
9 Asian and 11 African) in addition to 17 advanced countries. Instead of the usual quadratic 
form, the functional form proposed by Anand and Kanbur (1993) was estimated where the Gini 
coefficient (measured as a ratio) is regressed on mean income and its reciprocal. The result of the 
estimation, with an African dummy (Afdum), is reported in equation (17) below where figures 
between brackets are t-values: 
 
                                                 
12 As is well known Kuznets (1955) argued that in a dual economy inequality tends to increase with an increase in 
per capita income before it declines. Increases in per capita income are taken to represent the stage of development 
of countries. Thus, at early stages of development (i.e. low per capita incomes) countries are expected to be on the 
rising portion of the inequality-development relationship. This relationship has given rise to a lot of controversy but 
empirical results confirming its existence are to be found in, among others, Barro (2000), Bulir (1998), Jha  
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      (17)  θ = 0.5121- 0.0000203u-49.8037(1/u) + 0.06927 (Afdum);   R
2 = 0.329  
                      (13.41)   (-3.625)        (-2.199)             (2.078) 
 
Where u is GDP per capita in 1985 PPP. Given the existence of a Kuznets￿ relationship 
according to equation (17) the implied turning point for the Kuznets￿ relationship is $1566 per 
person per year in 1985 PPP. Thus for countries with per capita GDP below this turning point the 
Gini would be expected to increase as GDP per capita increases. For the purposes at hand, it will 
be expected that the South would display a lower degree on inequality than the North.  
 
Recall that in applying equation (17) to the case of Sudan for prediction purposes the intercept 
term will be 0.58137 on account of the fact that Sudan belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and as 
such the variable (Afdum) will take the value of one. Predicted regional Gini coefficients will of 
course depend on the population shares used.  Indeed, using the GDP figures reported above it is 
an easy matter to confirm that for 2000 the predicted Gini coefficients are 0.491 for the South, 
0.5403 for the North and 0.5375 for the country using the population share of 2000, and 0.4979 
for the South and 0.5418 for the North using the population share for 1955. These predicted Gini 
coefficients are much lower than those currently reported for Sudan albeit that the current Gini 
coefficients are based on household survey results confine only to the North.       
 
The estimated coefficients are used to derive a Kuznets￿ elasticity, a component of the growth 
elasticity of the head-count ratio. From equation (17) it is an easy matter to show that the 
Kuznets￿ elasticity is given by the following expression: 
      (18)  [d log θ /d log u] = κ = [- 0.0000203 u+ 49.8037 (1/u)]/Gini 
 
where the Gini in the formula is the predicted Gini. Using per GDP figures reported above it is 
an easy matter to show that the Kuznets￿ elasticity using 2000 population share for the South is 
about 0.21 (0.19 using 1955 population share), that for the North is 0.048 (0.038 using 1955 
population share) and that for the country is about 0.061. Table (3) provides the results in a 
transparent fashion.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
































South  0.156    461  0.4640  0.2127  0.2711    497  0.4711  0.1913 
North 0.844  1071 0.5131  0.0483 0.7289  1154 0.5149  0.0383 
Sudan  1.000    976  0.5105  0.0612  1.0000    976  0.5105  0.0612 
Source: own calculations.  
 
Using the results in tables (2) and (3) in equation (15) it is possible to estimate regional poverty 
magnitudes including the growth elasticity of poverty. It is to be recalled that in using equation 
(15) the Gini coefficient needs to be substituted in percentages and that the relevant measure of 
the standard of living is per capita consumption expenditure. The required information and the 
results are reported in table (4) where the growth elasticity of poverty will be calculated on the 
basis of the following formula:  
      (19)          γ = [-0.00163µ ] + [0.0124θ ]κ 
 
Table (4): 








































South  394 46.40  60.72  -0.5198  422 47.11  58.53  -0.5761 
North  911 51.31  27.79  -1.4542  982 51.49  24.80  -1.5762 
Sudan  830 51.05  31.61  -1.3142  830 51.05  31.61  -1.3142 
Source: own calculations.   
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The results in table (4) should be understood as average predictions rather than true descriptive 
magnitudes
13. The spread of poverty in the Sudan in the year 2000 is known to be much wider 
that 31.6% of the total population falling below the appropriate poverty line. Similarly, the head 
count ratios for the two regions are clearly underestimates. What is important to note is that the 
spread of poverty in the South is about 2.2 times that in the North. Taken as a measure of relative 
deprivation such ratio could be used for illustrative purposes and may be considered as 
reasonable. The growth elasticity of poverty for the two regions seem to be of reasonable 
magnitudes compared to Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
A remaining parameter that is needed for the calculations of the allocation formula is the 
elasticity of the per capita consumption expenditure of the South with respect to that of the 
North. Lack of appropriate time series data on regional per capita expenditure, or income, 
prevents a direct estimation of the elasticity in question. A reasonable proxy for this use can be 
made of the elasticity of the mean consumption expenditure of the poor with respect to that of 
the rich. In view of the earlier comparison of the per capita expenditure in the South with the 
international poverty line the suggested proxy seems justified.  
 
For a sample of 48 developing countries the following relationship is estimated where ￿p and ￿r 
are the per capita consumption expenditure of the poor and the rich respectively and where 
(afdum) is a dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa and where figures between brackets are absolute 
t-values: 
     (20)   Ln  ￿p = 0.6347 + 0.5842and ￿r ￿ 0.2009 (afdum); R-squared = 0.78  
                           (2.13)      (10.27)             (2.11) 
 
The above equation gives a constant elasticity of the mean consumption expenditure in the South 
to that of the North of about 0.58 implying that it will be expected for the consumption 
expenditure in the South to increase by about 0.6 of a percentage point increase in that of the 
North.   
                                                 
13 In an unpublished  report by the Ministry of Manpower (1997: 52) based on a migration and labor survey for the 
year 1996 hard core poverty is estimated as 49.9% for the country, 61.7% for the rural areas and 24.4% for the urban 
areas. These results are similar to the projected head count ratios above despite the difference in the definition of the 
sectors. Reported overall poverty, however, is much higher than these hard core estimates. It needs to be noted that 
the 1996 migration and labor survey does not constitute a high quality data set.    
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The elasticity of the income of the poor with respect to mean income was made famous by 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) who argued that there is a proportional relationship between the two 
incomes with the elasticity in question being equal to unity. The unitary elasticity result is based 
on the definition of the head-count ratio as the lowest quintile of the population for each country. 
Ali and Elbadawi (2001) have shown that such a result does not hold if the head count ratio is 
defined on the basis of a relevant poverty line and that the elasticity in question is less than unity 
in a statistically significant fashion
14. Nonetheless, in what follows use will be made of the 
unitary elasticity on the understanding that it is possible for the growth rate of per capita income 
of the South to be equal to that of the North. 
 
In addition to the above possibilities it is also reasonable to explore elasticity magnitudes that are 
in excess of unity implying a growth rate for the South greater than that for the North. The 
justification for such a possibility is to be found in the famous convergence hypothesis of 
neoclassical growth theory where it is expected that poor countries (or regions) to have growth 
rates higher than rich countries on their way to the steady state. The countries, or regions, in 
question are assumed to the same production technology as summarized by a standard 
neoclassical production function. Thus, for example, Barro and Sala-I- Marin (1995: 26) state the 
absolute convergence hypothesis as ￿regions or countries with lower starting value of 
capital/labor ratio have higher per capita growth rates and tend thereby to catch up or converge to 
those with higher capital/labor ratios￿.     
 
Collecting the relevant results and applying the formula in equation (13), table (5) reports the 
results for the possible share of the South on the assumption that the objective is to reduce 
poverty in the country. Two sets of results are reported as noted earlier where results subscripted 
by 1 are those based on using the population share of the year 2000 and those subscripted 2 are 
those using the 1955 population shares. Recall also that in these calculations per capita income, 
and consumption expenditure, of the South is assumed to be 0.43 of that of the North as per the 
national income accounts of 1955. For alternative 1 the head count ratios are 0.6072 for the 
                                                 
14 Ali and Elbadawi (2001) provide direct calculations and regression results for the elasticity of the income of the 
poor with respect to mean income of society for a sample of 48 developing countries and sub-groups of countries 
(18 Sub-Saharan African countries). From direct calculations the elasticity in question is 0.46 for Africa 
(significantly different from unity with a t-value of 23.48) and is 0.47 for the sample (significantly different from 
unity with a t-value of 26.5). Similar results are reported from regression analysis with semi-log and quadratic in 
logs that allow the elasticity to change with per capita income. The result in equation (20) of the text is based on the 
whole sample.  
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South and 0.2779 for the North; and the growth elasticity of poverty is ￿0.5198 for the South  
and ￿1.4542 for the South. For alternative 2 the head count ratio is 0.5853 for the South and 
0.248 for the North; and the growth elasticity of poverty is ￿0.5761 for the South and ￿1.5762 for 
the North. The results are reported for alternative values of the elasticity of the per capita 
consumption expenditure of the South with respect to that of the North. The share of the North is 
obviously the complement of that of the South.    
 
Table (5): 
The Share of the South in the Wealth of Sudan (percentages) 
 
Elasticity of Income of South with respect to that of North: E(µ sn)  0.58 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 
Alternative  1  31.18 43.85 53.95 60.97 66.13 70.09 
Alternative  2  33.35 46.31 56.41 63.31 68.83 72.13 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The table, it is suggested, reports a set of interesting results. The share of the South increases 
with an increase in the elasticity of the per capita consumption expenditure of the South with 
respect to that of the North for the two alternatives. Note, however, that the increase in the share 
of the South declines as the elasticity increases. The increase at the lower end of the elasticity is 
about 13 percentage points for the two alternatives and about 4 percentage points for alternative 
1 and about 3 percentage points for alternative 2 at the upper end. Alternative 1, which uses the 
population share of the South for the year 2000, gives lower shares that alternative 2, but the 
difference between the two alternatives does not exceed 3 percentage points. What is more 
significant is that the table clearly shows that the proposed formula is capable of reproducing the 
shares proposed in the Nakuru framework for the allocation of the net revenue from oil of   
48% for the South and 52% for the North. For both alternatives this allocation obtains for an 
elasticity of the expenditure in the South with respect to that of the North in excess of unity but 
less than 1.5. This implies that the Nakuru formula envisages convergence to take place between 





IV. Concluding Remarks:  
In this paper a framework for the design of an appropriate allocation of wealth between the South 
and the North regions of Sudan is proposed. It is claimed that the framework should be 
acceptable to both parties in view of the fact that it is derived from the internationally agreed 
upon MDG on poverty reduction. The results show that the Nakuru proposal of 48% of net oil 
revenue to be allocated to the South can be justified on the basis of the framework. Despite this, 
however, it is acknowledged that any allocation formula to be based on the framework requires 
adequate knowledge of the poverty parameters involved. These poverty parameters depend, 
among other things, on precise knowledge of the distribution of population between the two 
regions. In this respect the ultimate application of the proposed framework requires a population 
census to be conducted. Unfortunately, this time around the census instrument needs to be 
designed in such a manner as to seek the determination of the ethnic composition of the 
population. This in turn requires agreement on the definition of who is a Southern Sudanese.  
 
Further, the ultimate application of the proposed formula would require a high quality household 
budget survey to be conducted. This is vital in view of the guiding principles (b) and (c) ￿in 
respect of an equitable sharing of common wealth￿ that emphasize comparative living standards 
in the two regions. As this paper has shown the relevant information on living standards does not 
exist at present and as such any design of the sharing formula would be subject to criticism as 
being ad hoc. Standards for high quality data for use in income, and expenditure, distribution and 
poverty studies have been explored by, among others, Dininger and Squire (1996: 567-571). The 
requirements are (i) that the data be based on actual observation of individual units drawn from 
household surveys; (ii) that the data ￿even if drawn from household surveys, be based on a 
representative sample covering all of the population￿; and (iii) that income data should be based 
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